Vol. 5 No. 1 (2025): Studia Humanitatis Journal
Articles: monographic section

Christine Ladd-Franklin and the metaphor of knowledge as a woven tissue

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  • Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe
Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5656-8047 (unauthenticated) University of Navarra image/svg+xml

Bio
DOI: https://doi.org/10.33732/shj.v5i1.142

Published 2025-01-31

Keywords

  • Histurgy,
  • Foundations of the sciences,
  • Realism,
  • Epistemic justification,
  • Coherentism,
  • Pragmatism,
  • Verificationism
    • ...More
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Abstract

I study Ladd-Franklin’s epistemology, placing it in the context of the ideal of scientific philosophy that was common in Europe and America in the early years of the twentieth century. Within this project, I first show how she contributes to the realism-idealism discussion by providing a logical core that should serve as a foundation for the advancement of philosophical discussion. Focusing on epistemology, I first pay attention to the distinctions she draws as a prolegomenon (particular truths versus universal truths, induction by enumeration versus probable induction, instances of a general statement versus its deductive consequences, isolated truths versus systems of knowledge), and then focus on the images with which she illustrates her conception of knowledge. The metaphor of the network emphasizes the deductive systematization of knowledge. The simile of the banyan tree emphasizes the strengthening of this structure over time, with the appropriate combination of deductive development and experimental control. The metaphor of knowledge as a woven tissue, which gives its name to his Doctrine of Histurgy, insists on the epistemic value of mutual support between truths, which must be maintained over time for the system to acquire stability. The contrast with two rival positions, coherentism and verificationism, helps to clarify Ladd-Franklin’s proposal, in order to understand correctly what the typical consensus of the sciences consists of and what philosophy should aspire to.

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